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Business Associations-1963 Tennessee Survey
Robert N. Covington*
I. EXISTENCE OF PARTNERSIP-EFFECT OF LICENSING STATUTE

II. SHAnEHOLDER'S BIr To INSPECT BooS

III.

DUTY OF MAJORITY SHA2REHOLDERS

IV. ENFORCEABILITY OF CORPORATE NOTE MADE TO OFFICER

Section two of the act creating Tennessee's new Law Revision
Commission charges that body with the duty to study and report to
the next legislature on "the laws governing the organization and
operation of corporations, partnerships and other forms of business
and social endeavor." The study is now roughly a year old and is
reportedly making good headway. Since much of our law of business
organizations may therefore be changed in the near future, this Survey
has been abbreviated as much as possible. Four cases decided during
1963, however, seem likely to have some continuing impact, and these
have been selected for treatment here.
I. EXISTENCE OF PARTNERSHIP-EFFECT OF LICENSING STATUTE
Complainant in Lloyd v. Wiseman' sought recovery of his share of
the profits of a partnership dealing in real estate of which he was
allegedly a member. Defendant answered that there was no partnership, and that complainant should be barred from recovery for failure
to obtain a real estate broker's license. The Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed a decision in favor of complainant.
The chancellor's finding that a partnership existed was based on
testimony by complainant and one McCracken, another partner not
involved in the suit. The testimony of both men was to the effect
that defendant, complainant and McCracken agreed to work together
in the real estate business and to share both profits and losses equally.
The sharing of profits is by statute prima facie evidence of the
existence of a partnership.2 It is also true, however, that a number
of American cases have failed to find a partnership to deal in real
estate in spite of the presence of profit-sharing.3 When profit sharing
is combined with a sharing of losses, however, the instant decision is
in accord with a majority of cases, and with Tennessee precedent.4
* Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; Faculty editor, Vanderbilt Law
Review.
1.
2.
3.
4.

368 S.W.2d 303 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1963) (western section sitting at Knoxville).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 61-106(4) (1956).
1 ROWLEY, PARTNERsmPs § 7.5 (2d ed. 1960).
Fowler v. Stone's River Nat'l Bank, 57 S.W. 209 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1899).
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The court offered two bases for rejecting defendant's argument
based on the failure to license. The first was that the partnership
here dealt only in its own lands and was therefore excepted from
the statute.5 The second, more important for the development of
partnership law, was that defendant was estopped from asserting the
failure to license. By its citations of authority one is led to believe
that the court might not be willing to
apply the doctrine were the
6
transactions engaged in malum in se.

To INSPECT Booxs
State ex rel. Lowell Wiper Supply Co. v. Helen Shop, Inc.7 was a
mandamus action to compel defendant corporation to permit relator, as
a shareholder, to inspect corporate books -and records. Defendant
opposed the suit on two grounds: (1) that relator was not a shareholder; and (2) that relator's damages remedy under section 48-308
of the code is exclusive.
The shares to which relator asserted title were given him as security
for a loan by the debtor, who admittedly was a shareholder. When the
debtor was unable to repay the loan at the proper time, the shares
were transferred to relator, and the transfer was subsequently recorded
in defendant's books. Defendant alleged that it had not been advised
whether this transfer was bona fide, and further alleged that the
transfer was improper for lack of consent to the transfer by the former
shareholder. The court found as a matter of fact that the former
shareholder had acquiesced in the transfer of stock. Thus even had
relator not been credited on the corporation's books with ownership
of the shares, he would have been entitled to treatment as a shareholder." Moreover, since defendant had listed relator as a stockowner
and had for some time treated relator as a stockowner, defendant
should be estopped from denying relator's title. 9
II.

SHAREHOLDER'S

IGHT

5. TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-1301 (1956). One wishes the court had commented on
the language of the exemption more fully. It is limited to transactions "performed in
the regular course of or as an incident to the management of such property and the
investment therein ..

" The precise meaning of "management" is left unclear. One

wonders also whether the statute is in any way intended to protect persons in defendant's status.
6. See Memphis & Ark. River Packet Co. v. Agnew, 132 Tenn. 265, 273-75, 177

S.W. 949 (1915); 6A ComiN, CONTmACTS § 1378, 1510-13 (1962); 1 ROWLEY, PARTNERS5,s § 6.7 at 86, nn.45, 46 (2d ed. 1960).
7. 362 S.W.2d 787 (Tenn. 1962).

8. Title in Tennessee has been viewed as going with the certificate. TENN. CODE
ANN. § 48-1003 (1956); Figuers v. Sherrell, 181 Tenn. 87, 178 S.W.2d 629 (1944).
The provisions of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act previously in force will be modified
by the adoption of article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code. For a brief survey of
the changes, see Note, 22 TENN. L. REv. 842 (1953).

9. The court does not dwell on the estoppel point, doubtless because of the presence
of an alternative basis of decision. One wishes the opinion had outlined the elements
of the estoppel more clearly, for the very brief treatment given makes it difficult to
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Section 48-308 gives shareholders who have wrongfully been denied
access to corporate stock books a right to sue for a penalty of 50
dollars for each day of wrongful refusal. If defendant's argument in
the instant case had been accepted, it would have been possible for a
corporation to continue indefinitely to keep its records from a shareholder, so long as the corporation would be willing to pay the fifty
dollars. Certainly the court is correct in holding that the traditional
mandamus remedy remains available. 10
The court also declined to revise the decree so as to require inspection of only those records made since relator became a shareholder.
Conceding that a purchaser of shares has no greater rights than the
prior holder, the court instructed the chancellor on remand to consider the possibility that relator's vendor had acquiesced in various
corporate acts in seeing to it that the inspection order is carried out
within reasonable bounds."
III. DuTy

OF MAJORY SHARMOLDERS

After several years of litigation and negotiation, the Phillips and
Buttorff-Moore Dry Goods dispute is burning itself out, having
exuded during its history rather more heat than light. The basic
transactions which ignited the controversy, as enunciated by the Sixth
Circuit in Maggiore v. Bradford,2 were these:
Brokers, who were made defendants in the action, acquired the shares of
P & B on the order of Guy L. Comer with temporary financing. The shares
were placed in the name of Church of Christ Foundation, a corporation not
for profit, of which Mr. Comer was a trustee. Woodstock Corporation, a
Comer company, with the authority of the Foundation and its subsidiary,
First National Company, gave P & B an option to purchase the Moore shares
at $45.00 a share. P & B loaned $2,000,000 to Woodstock secured by a
assess the ruling for future use. For a similar decision, also with very little discussion,
see Bassin v. Enoch-Pearl Co., 140 N.J. Eq. 428, 54 A.2d 824, 826 (1947).
10. It is surprising that this point had not previously been adjudicated, since the
statute has been on the books since 1929. Defendant's argument has a certain literal
plausibility to it if one considers a statement from an opinion delivered prior to enactment of this statute: "[Mandamus] is regarded in both courts as in the nature of a
prerogative writ, to be granted only in the high discretion of the court, and to be
applied only to those cases as to which no other remedy exists." Brown v. Crystal
Ice Co., 122 Tenn. 239, 243, 122 S.W. 84, 85 (1909). The statement, however, was
not absolutely necessary to the decision. Statutes of this type have generally been
regarded as extending rather than restricting the right of inspection. See 5 Frircnxn,
CYCLOPEDA oF CoRnPoA.rIONS § 2215.1 (rev. vol. 1952).
11. As this and other points of defense would indicate, defendant distrusted the
relators motivation. The court could find no evidence to support this doubt. In its
discussion, however, it made it clear that it does not regard the common law right of
inspection as absolute. See Wood v. Myers Paper Co., 3 Tenn. App. 128 (W.S.
1926), in which inspection was refused because of improper motives. The statute
specifically retains the defense for the penalty action. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-308

(1956).
12. 310 F.2d 519, 520 (6th Cir. 1962).
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pledge of the Moore stock, which pledge was made by permission of the
owners. The brokers through Woodstock gave First National Company an
option to purchase 75,721 shares of the common stock of P & B, which
carried the control of P & B. First National Company assigned its option on
the P & B stock to the Foundation which exercised it. P & B exercised its
option and purchased the Moore shares.
As of December 31, 1955 P & B had cash on hand of $953,335.53 and
investments in government and other marketable securities totaling about
$2,000,000. In order to make the loan to Woodstock and purchase the
Moore stock, P & B liquidated its securities and borrowed additional money
from a bank. The Comer Group had previously acquired the Moore shares
by the use of Moore's assets and the shares were placed in the name of the
Foundation.
These transactions were attacked by a derivative action brought in

federal court by minority shareholders, seeking rescission of the sale.
While the action was pending, the Moore stock transaction was in
effect rescinded, for P & B resold its Moore stock to the Foundation for
the forty-five dollars a share it had paid. Plaintiffs amended their
complaint to seek recovery of operating losses sustained by P & B
prior to the rescission and attorneys' fees incurred by the shareholders
in the instant action. The district court held against plaintiffs on both
counts.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of recovery of
operating losses, finding the lower court's decision that those losses
were attributable to other causes to be adequately supported. On the
liability of defendants for attorneys' fees, however, the court reversed.
The district court had held that the evidence failed to show that the
Comer interests actually exercised control of P & B. On this, the
circuit court said simply that "the transaction speaks for itself." The
court found it too difficult to believe that the P & B officers and
directors would have entered into the maze of stock transfers involved
unless guided by Comer and his associates.
Having found the Comer group to be responsible for P & B's
conduct, the court went on to find that this conduct violated the
fiduciary duty owed by dominant shareholders to minority shareholders. It was not necessary, it was felt, to decide whether under
Tennessee law self-dealing of this sort is per se violative or whether
the Tennessee standard is one of fairness; under either standard the
court felt defendants' acts were culpable. 13 Reduced to essentials, this
conduct amounted to "stripping P & B of its cash and marketable
securities and requiring it to borrow money so that the Comer group
13. The Tennessee standard remains less than clearly defined. For a discussioA
concluding that fairness is the test when officers deal with the corporation see Roberts,
Business Associations-1960 Tennessee Survey, 13 VAND. L. REv. 999-1004 (1960).
For a general discussion of standards of conduct applicable to dominant shareholders,
see 1 HonNsTxN, CORPOnATnON LAW AND PRACTIC § 365 (1959).
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could finance their controlling shares. . . ." Thus defendants would
have been liable to rescind. Based on this holding, the court went on
to award interest on the P & B funds used for the stock transfer, for
the period from the date suit was filed to the date of rescission.
Credit was allowed for dividends and interest paid to P & B by Woodstock and Moore.
Since the plaintiffs were now successful complainants who could
be credited with benefitting the corporation by prosecution of this
action, it was appropriate to award counsel fees to their attorneys. 14
The case was remanded to the district court for this purpose.
It should be noted that the court permitted this action even though
plaintiffs had made no demand on the directors to act. 15 The court
felt that the failure of the corporation to act for nearly a year after
the action was commenced was sufficient proof that demand would
6
have been futile.'
IV. ENFORCEABILITY OF CORPORATE NOTE MADE TO OFFICER
Plaintiff's decedent in Fidelity Bankers Trust Co. v. Chapman Drug
Co.' 7 had served for several years as treasurer of defendant corporation. While serving he from time to time made loans to defendant,
receiving promissory notes in exchange. Three of these notes were
signed by defendant's president, while ten were signed by decedent
as treasurer, including the note on which this action was brought.
Defendant argued two propositions: First, that decedent lacked
authority to execute the note; and second, that the note was invalid
because it was the result of self-dealing.
The court disposed of the points in reverse order. The opinion
states the clearly correct rule that "the fiduciary relationship of a
corporate officer to the corporation does not preclude the officer from
lending the corporation money and taking a note therefor, in the
absence of fraud or circumstances indicating detriment to the corporation." 8 To take any other view would be to preclude the persons
most interested in the success of the business from giving it aid in
the moments of financial distress which occur in the life of almost
every commercial venture.
The question of authority was also decided for plaintiff on two
alternative bases. While the board of directors had never specifically
authorized decedent to execute notes to himself, this practice had been
14. See generally 2 HoRNsTEI, op. cit. supra note 13, § 732.
15. Id. § 717.
16. See Akin v. Mackie, 203 Tenn. 113, 119-2,2, 310 S.W.2d 164 (1958).
17. 366 S.W.2d 528 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1962).
18. 366 S.W.2d at 532. Accord, In re Madelaine, Inc., 164 F.2d 419 (2d Cir. 1947);
Goldstein v. Wolfson, 132 F.2d 624, 626 (2d Cir. 1943); Arnold v. Phillips, 117 F.2d
497, 503 (5th Cir. 1941).
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engaged in for over a decade. The books, with which one would
assume the board to be familiar, had shown these transactions clearly
throughout the period. Moreover, defendant's president clearly knew
of several of the transactions since he signed three notes payable to
decedent. This pattern fits rather neatly into the traditional agency
doctrine that "acquiescence by the principal in a series of acts by
the agent indicates authorization to perform similar acts in the
future."19
Even had the court not found decedent to have had authority to
execute the notes, a holding for plaintiff would have been likely on
the basis of ratification. Retention of benefits to which a principal
is entitled only through an act of his agent purportedly on his behalf
serves to affirm the transaction, provided the principal has knowledge
of the relevant facts.20
19. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), AGENCY § 43(2) (1958). See also Gilman v. F. 0.
Bailey Carriage Co., 127 Me. 91, 141 Atl. 321 (1928) (loans to corporation by its
general financial officer shown in audits circulated to board).
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 99 (1958).

